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While land reforms have long been motivated as a potential policy lever of rural growth 
and development, there is remarkably little evidence of the direct impacts of such 
reforms. In an effort to fill this lacunae, this paper examines South Africa's Land 
Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) program. We show that the 
implementation of this program operates as a natural experiment in which self-selected 
and administratively-filltered LRAD applicants receive land transfers at random points 
in time. This random exit from the application pipeline creates creates exogenous 
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of exogenous variation, we estimate average and long-run treatment effects that imply a 
discounted gain in monthly per capita consumption of about fifty per cent after three 
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A rich, though largely theoretical literature suggests that asset inequality can be economi-
cally detrimental if it leaves large numbers of low wealth agents unable to fully utilize their
endowments and productive opportunities because they lack access to necessary contracts for
nancial or other resources.1 Corespondingly, asset transfers to the poor are a potential win-
win in this literature, reducing poverty and enhancing aggregate productivity.2 By enabling
lower wealth agents to realize their economic capabilities, asset transfer programs would thus
seem to oer a distinct advantage as an anti-poverty program relative to the conditional cash
transfer programs that have become a preferred tool in the anti-poverty toolkit.
Yet there has been relatively little empirical demonstration of the eectiveness of asset
transfer programs, especially relative to the outpouring of empirical analyses of cash trans-
fer programs. Taking advantage of a natural experiment that emerged from South Africa's
market-assisted land reform program, this paper provides some of the rst estimates of the
poverty impacts of land redistribution that plausibly satisfy the strong exogeneity assumptions
regarding treatment assignment. While our analysis primarily focuses on the intrinsic value of
land to reform beneciaries, our ndings of large anti-poverty impacts and high rates of return
to public funds invested in the program are consistent with the win-win logic that could make
asset transfer programs smart public policy.
The relative scarcity of empirical evidence on asset transfers is understandable. While, the
last century has seen any number of land redistribution schemes, they are hard to evaluate
because the events giving rise to them are decidedly non-random, and options for credibly
identifying their impacts are few. At the macro-level, much of the evidence on the instrumen-
tal value of egalitarian land ownership is derived from cross-country growth regressions, so
the usual questions of data comparability and dierences in historical legacies across societies
confound causal interpretation.3 At the micro-level, there is a hyper-abundant literature that
explores the inverse farm size-farm productivity relationship.4 While linked to the traditional
\economic case for land reform," few, if any, of the studies in this literature explicitly concern
redistributive reforms.5 Most explore data generated by the historical farm size distribution,
1Foundations for this perspective are found in static models such as Dasgupta and Ray (1986), Eswaran
and Kotwal (1986), Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis (2000), and Mookherjee and Ray (2002). Subsequent work has
shown that overall economic performance can remain sensitive to asset inequality even in the context of dynamic
models in which agents have time (and optimal savings plans) as another degree of freedom to work around
missing contracts and nancial markets. For example, see Ray and Streufert (1993), Carter and Zimmerman
(2000) and Galor and Zeira (1993)
2As rst noted by Dasgupta and Ray (1986), these transfers may not be strictly Pareto improving, despite
their win-win characteristic.
3Deininger and Olinto (2000) is perhaps the most convincing analysis of this genre because of their use of
xed eects methods to control for intrinsic country heterogeneity.
4See for example Berry and Cline (1979), Carter (1984), Shaban (1987), Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993),
Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995), and Lipton, Eastwood and Newell (2009). See also Lipton, Ellis and
Lipton (1996) and Van Zyl, Kirsten and Binswanger (1996) for the case of South Africa.
5Dorner (1970) and Kanel (1968) articulate the classic instrumental economic case for land redistribution,
arguing that agency costs in agricultural labor markets create an inverse relationship between farm productivity
2raising a plethora of identication concerns (i.e., are \naturally occurring" small farms intrin-
sically more productive because they have better soils, better farmers, etc.) More relevant to
this paper, there are few studies that directly explore the causal impact of land redistribution
on the living standards of reform beneciaries.
The absence of such studies in part re
ects the shift of land policy over the last 25 years away
from redistribution and toward land titling and tenancy reform programs.6 But it also re
ects
the complexity of evaluating interventions as politically potent and economically complicated
as land redistribution. While randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have been used to study
modest asset transfers, no country to date has implemented land redistribution by randomly
distributing land to some, but not other, potential beneciaries.7
This paper shows that the on-the-ground implementation of South Africa's Land Redis-
tribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme mimics an RCT. LRAD makes
available land purchase grants to landless farm workers and labor tenants. Because it does not
mandate redistribution of land and operates on a willing buyer { willing seller basis, LRAD
operates as a natural experiment in which self-selected and administratively-ltered LRAD
applicants receive land transfers at random points in time unrelated to the characteristics of
the applicant or of the land being purchased. This random exit from the LRAD application
pipeline creates a natural control group of approved LRAD applicants who were, as of the sur-
vey date, denied asset transfers for exogenous reasons. It also creates random variation in the
extent or duration of exposure to the asset transfer program amongst those who have received
land transfers. We will here exploit both sources of exogenous variation in program exposure to
identify both an average treatment eect and a long-run policy-relevant treatment eect. We
nd that land transfers associated with LRAD lead to very strong welfare gains for program
participants. Accounting for heterogeneity in the length of exposure to the program, we nd
long-run treatment eects of 20-30%, which translate to an annual return that is suciently
high to oset the upfront direct costs per household within three years.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the core challenge
of evaluating the impact of the LRAD program and shows how its implementation generates
a natural experiment in which treatment assignment works as a virtual lottery. Section 3 then
devises and implements a strategy for estimating the average treatment eect of LRAD land
transfers under this virtual lottery. Section 4 then expands the analysis to look at treatment
heterogeneity in the duration (or exposure) to the program, which we estimate through a
duration of treatment response function. Section 5 concludes the paper with re
ections on the
comparative ecacy of land reform as an anti-poverty program.
and size such that aggregate output and economic performance increase with land redistribution.
6Both titling and tenancy reform policies have been extensively studied (see for example, the review in World
Bank (2003)). The recent literature on tenacy reform has been dominated by studies of the Indian experience{see
for example Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2008).
7See de Mel, McKenzie and Woodru (2008) for an example of an RCT concerning physical capital.
32 Identifying the Impact of LRAD Land Redistribution on
Poverty
The active dispossession of the land rights of South Africa's majority population was a cor-
nerstone of colonial policy in South Africa and the apartheid era that followed. Consequently,
it is not surprising that the rst democratically elected government brought forward a land
reform rhetoric and agenda in 1994. Ironically, the very thoroughness of dispossession had all
but eliminated the conventional peasant smallholder class that was the economic focal point
of land reform in other countries. In South Africa of the mid-1990s, land reform was conse-
quently pursued as a restitution of legal rights, with lesser attention to securing the economic
benets typically associated with land reform eorts. The result, perhaps predictably, was an
ineective program that met with sluggish uptake. Reacting to this reality, the South African
government overhauled its land reform program in 2001, creating the Land Redistribution for
Agricultural Development (LRAD) program.
Styled on the market-assisted land reform model, LRAD was intended to provide land to
individuals with an interest in farming. The program works on the basis of a grant that is
awarded to beneciaries on a sliding scale. The minimum grant of R20 000 requires a matching
contribution (in cash or in-kind) of R5 000. The maximum grant of R100 000 requires a
matching contribution amount of R400 000. In practice, grants are pooled into a fund that is
administered on behalf of the beneciaries by the state or a project formed by the prospective
beneciaries. These funds are then used to purchase land, which is then transferred to the
beneciaries.
As with other market-assisted programs, LRAD was intended to rely on beneciary self-
selection, assuring that resources would be channeled to those most interested in farming, and
best able to benet from the redistribution. While this feature is attractive from a program
design perspective, this heavy reliance on self-selection makes more dicult the challenge of
evaluating the impacts of LRAD on household economic well-being.
Using conventional notation, the impact evaluation challenge is to reliably estimate the
counterfactual economic status of beneciaries had they not been treated, E(y0jx;D = 1) so
that the average treatment eect on the treated can be caluculated as:
ATT = E(y1j;x;D = 1)   E(y0jx;D = 1)
Unfortunately, the very essence of the LRAD program and its reliance on self-selection,
implies that the mean outcomes of the non-beneciary population is unlikely to provide a
plausible approximation to the counterfactual outcomes of a randomized out sample of would-
be treated households.
Our solution to this evaluation problem rests upon a detailed understanding of the mechan-
ics of the LRAD program. In brief, we will show that the implementation of LRAD creates a
4natural control group of individuals subject to the same double selection process as benecia-
ries, but whose receipt of program benets have been delayed for exogenous reasons. Before
detailing this identication stragety, we need to rst plumb the details of the LRAD program
in practice.
2.1 The LRAD Application and Approval Process
Primarily targeted at small-scale black farmers and farmworkers, LRAD has 5 stages. Would
be beneciaries of LRAD grants must pass through the following ve stages:
1. Project Registration: The rst stage in the LRAD approval process is registration
of applications to the program. Once an application is submitted, a state appointed ocial
(hereafter referred to as the \planner") does a needs assessment by visiting the site on which
the applicants live as well as the land they have applied to purchase (which need not coincide
with the the current place of occupancy of the applicants). Once the application has been
veried, the application is \registered" as as candidate land redistribution project.
2. Approval of Planning Grant: Stage 2 begins when the planner requests the district line
authority of the land aairs department to release a nominal sum of money to begin developing
a proposal on behalf of the applicants. The funds are meant to be used to commission various
specialised activities that will culminate in a portfolio of sorts that will ultimately be used by
the planner both to negotiate a purchase price for the land, as well as to serve as a basis for the
deliberation that will occur over nal approval of the application. Examples of such activities
are valuations, soil assessments, land surveys, and business plans.
3. Preparation of Project Identication Report: Once these commissioned studies
start to materialize, the planner begins to work with the applicants in an eort to iterate
towards a workable proposal which will ultimately be submitted to the state as background
motivation for the application. This proposal preparation stage is an important process that
is handled through a series of workshops between relevant role-players and culminates in the
preparation of a document called the project identication report (PIR), which summarizes
the merits of the application. The existence of this document is an important milestone in the
approval process as it signals that the applicants have a strong enough interest and background
in farming to have warranted the release and expenditure of state resources to begin making
the case for the grant.
4. Approval by District Screening Committee: In stage 4, the planner then submits
this document to a district-level screening committee (DSC) of the land aairs department.
The primary purpose of the DSC is to vet applications so as to improve their likelihood of ap-
proval when submitted for consideration to the provincial grants approval committee (PGAC),
5which is the the main body tasked with granting nal approval of the application. This body
has broad representation from all role players including ocials from the agriculture depart-
ment, surveyor general's oce and local municipalities. The role of the DSC is to pre-screen
applications before they are passed on for nal approval by the PGAC. Once an application has
been approved by the DSC, a formal request to designate the land for redistributive purposes
is made. At this stage a quasi-legal document called the \designation memo" is prepared,
which is what the provincial grants approval committee deliberates over when making their
nal decision. This document must ultimately be signed by the directors general and ministers
of land aairs and agriculture. A key hurdle that applications reaching stage 4 must over-
come is that there must be complementarity around basic service provision (roads, irrigation,
electrication).
5. Final Transfer by Provincial Grants Approval Committee: Beyond its complexity,
there is nothing especially remarkable about this multi-stage application and approval process.
However, applicants often experience random delays in this nal stage of approval. Interviews
with program administrators in the eld revealed that in practice stage 4-approved applicants
often become mired in stage 5, facing considerable and highly variable delays in receiving
program benets, if they receive them at all. Two key reasons were invariably cited by program
sta for why there might be a delay at stage 5. Firstly, there could be a competing claim for
the land oered up by the seller. For example, a fairly frequent occurrence is where the land
that is oered up for sale by the current landowner turns out to be the subject of a legal
dispute between the seller and third-party descendants of previously dispossessed individuals
under Apartheid.8 Secondly, the seller might withdraw from the agreement at the last minute
as a strategy to renegotiate pertinent terms of the agreement such as the selling price.9 In
probing specic examples where such events had taken place, it became clear that although not
infrequent, these reasons for a delay in approval had little, if anything, to do with beneciary
characteristics. Re
ecting the randomness of this process, we will refer to exit from this process,
and receipt of a land transfer, as the Stage 5 Lottery.
Note that applicants caught in stage 5 of the pipeline have passed through the same two
selection processes or lters passed by LRAD beneciaries: they have self-selected into the
program and their business plans have been similarly scrutinized, modied as needed and
8Forced removals under Apartheid had devastating consequences in both urban and rural areas. A major
thrust of the Mandela-era land reforms focused on restoring the rights of the previously dispossessed to their
descendants. This program, known as the \restitution" program, was terminated at the end of of the 1990's.
However, many of the claims made under that program have proved to be quite complex to resolve. Cases are
usually held by a special court set up to hear such disputes, which, in some instances can end up never being
fully resolved. The overhang of this program, and the fact that the bureaucratic structures that handle these
claims operate somewhat separately from programs like LRAD, often lead to situations where much progress
can be made on an LRAD application, only to discover that the PGAC has to withhold nal approval until the
outcome of the dispute is resolved in a land claims court.
9A reason less frequently cited for delays in nal approval of an application concerns a failure by local councils
to meet their targeted roll-out of basic infrastructure in a district aected by an impending redistribution of
land.
6approved by the LRAD technical sta. The random exclusion of these individuals from benets
(or random delay in their receipt of benets) provides the basis for the two identication
strategies that we utilize here. One strategy will utilize the double ltered applicants still
stuck in stage 5 (the Stage 5 Lottery losers) as our counterfactual of interest E(y0jx;D = 1), in
order to estimate an average treatment eect of the LRAD program. The second strategy will
utilize the random timing in the exit of applicants from stage 5 as the basis of a continuous
treatment estimator that identies the impact of length of exposure to the LRAD program on
the outcomes of the treated.
2.2 Sample Construction and Characteristics
To implement the identication strategy outlined above, we began by constructing sampling
frames comprising listings of all households that had either applied for or that had received
land through the LRAD programme. The programme is implemented at the farm level, so
the sampling follows a multi-level design, where the farm currently occupied (control group)
or owned (treatment group) represents level 1 of the sampling design.10 A random sample of
farms with probability proportional to the number of beneciary or applicant households on
the farm was drawn from each sampling frame.
Level 2 of our sampling design concerns the process of screening and ltration that happens
as an application nears nal approval. As mentioned above, the existence of a \designation
memo" measures whether an application successfully navigated the rst four stages of the
approval process. We therefore checked for the existence of this document for applicants in the
LRAD pipeline that had been sampled for study. Where this type of documented evidence of
stage 4 traversal could not be located, we interviewed LRAD program sta and delved further
into archived PIRs of applicants so as to establish a timeline of milestones that would have
been achieved as the application neared nal approval. Ultimately, if we determined that a
sampled application had not passed stage 4 of the approval process, a replacement applicant
was found that did meet this criteria. The third and nal stage of sampling happens at the
farm level. For sampled treatment farms as well as control group farms that had survived the
screening process, a random sample of households was then drawn and interviewed.
The nal sample comprises 1650 households, of which 448 households are in the treatment
group and 1202 households are the twice ltered, post-stage 4 control group households. Table
1 shows the means and standard deviations of the key variables used in our analysis.
Since we are interested in measuring the impact of LRAD on poverty, our welfare metric of
choice is monthly per capita consumption.11 We explicitly choose not to use a binary indicator
10Applicants are usually farm workers or labour-tenants who have applied to the LRAD programme to pur-
chase the land which they farm, or are subsistence farmers who wish to purchase a subdivision of a neighbouring
or nearby farm.
11We have also conducted our analysis using alternative de
ators of household consumption than household
size, such as the number of adult-equivalents in the household, estimated using Engel's method. These alternate
forms of normalization do not change any of our substantive conclusions or interpretations, so we only report
results for per-capita consumption.
7of poverty status since this is a less ecient way of dening poverty outcomes when working
with quasi-experimental data designs (Ravallion 2008).12
Table 1 shows that mean consumption in treatment households is 128.1 rands higher than
the control group mean consumption, and this dierence is signicant at the 1% level. In an-
ticipation of later continuous treatment analysis, Table 1 also disaggregates treated households
into terciles based on the duration of time since they had received their land transfers. As
can be seen, mean per-capita consumption consistently increases as the period of time since
land transfers increases from less than two years, to 2-3 years to more than 3 years. If we rely
solely on the ecacy of the natural experiment created by LRAD implementation, then these
dierences can be attributed to the eect of the program. However, as we argued earlier, it
is possible that imperfections in the natural experiment may leave some dierences between
treatment and control groups. To test for the robustness of our measures, we construct and
examine variables that could proxy for the processes that appeared to matter qualitatively in
the screening processes discussed above.
A possible confound not addressed by the natural experiment that plays out through the
stage 5 lottery is that applicants that applied later may be less likely to have received land
transfers by the survey date, or might have received it for a lesser period of time. To explore
this possibility, we formed the variable application date, which measures the number of days
elapsed from the date of application to the LRAD program, to the date on which the household
was rst interviewed. As can be seen in Table 1, treated households on average applied 128 days
(or about 4 months) earlier than did control households. Similarly, households with more than
3 years of exposure to land transfers applied on average 132 days earlier than households with
less than 2 years of exposure to land transfers. While these 4 month dierences are modest,
there could be some concern that earlier applicants are somehow dierent than later applicants.
As can be seen in Table 1, earlier applicants are in fact better educated. In addition, we might
worry that these earlier applicants may be more entrepreneurial or exhibit other unobserved
characteristic that predicts economic success. If this latter concern is in fact correct, then
application date should in fact serve as a proxy for these unobserved characteristics. In both
the binary and continuous treatment analysis that follows, we will employ application date as
one of the variables on which we match across treatment status groups.13
In addition to these timing variables, Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on other charac-
teristics of the control and treatment groups. Interestingly, gender, education, and a revealed
preference to move in order to gain approval all appear to be statistically signicant in sepa-
12We also do not normalise expenditure by a poverty line, because there is some controversy in the case of
South Africa as to which is the most appropriate line to use (Woolard and Leibbrandt 2007).
13In addition to concerns about application date, we might also worry that a 'good' applicant will progress
more rapidly through the LRAD approval process then a 'bad' applicant. Ideally, we would like to match
on a measure of duration of time that the individual spent in the rst four stages of application pipeline.
Unfortunately, we do not have such a measure. Fortunately, given that we can control for application date
(which is likely to also be correlated with this time in the pipeline) and given that all the households used for
the study passed through the rst four stages, this residual source of bias can at most be quite modest.
8rating the treated from control group households, as is evidenced by the low p-values of a test
of equality of means for these variables. To explore these issues further, the next section uses
these variables to estimate the probability of being treated.
3 Binary Treatment Impacts of the LRAD Program
A possible concern with our identication strategy is that the initial application date might
be factor that aects the timing of the exit from stage 5. That is, applicants that choose to
apply earlier might be expected to exit the pipeline and receive a longer duration of LRAD
treatment. We examine this concern empirically in this section. As we have already discussed
in section 2.2, the implicit lottery that takes place in stage 5 of the approvals process does
a reasonably good job of washing out the correlation between the date of application and
observed treatment status. However, to better account for potential non-randomness of entry
in the LRAD pipeline, we use propensity score matching.
3.1 Modeling the Probability of Treatment
A major drawback of models based on the selection-on-obsersables assumption is that there
is no resolved method for choosing among possible sets of covariates. There is however some
evidence from replication studies to suggest that a greater set of controls leads to a reduction in
bias.14 However, a mechanical approach whereby one tries to include the most exhaustive set of
available covariates can often be a double-edged sword. Under conditional mean independence,
matching on the propensity score must balance the data. While there are a range of tests to
check for the balancing property, these tests are more informative about how to go about
picking the correct functional form for a specic set of regressors, rather than how to choose
between alternative sets of regressors (Smith and Todd 2005).15 If one simply chooses the most
exhaustive set of regressors that maximizes the prediction rate, say according to the hit-or-miss
criterion, this might be at the cost of balancing the covariates.16 Matching on the propensity
score alone therefore does not necessarily solve the identication problem.17
However, by combining the insights gleaned from the administrative screening process out-
lined in section 2.1, with the apparent lottery that takes place in stage 5, we are able to model
the selection probability such that the key assumptions required for matching are satised. Key
14By \replication study" we mean a study where an estimate of E(y0jx;D = 1) from a randomised-out
control group of the D = 1 sub-population serves as a benchmark against which non-experimentally derived
counterfactuals are compared. See for example Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) and Smith and
Todd (2005).
15For example, Dehejia and Wahba (2002) present an algorithm that is based on Theorem 2 of Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983). See Eichler and Lechner (2002) for an alternative approach.
16The hit or miss method to maximize the within-sample correct prediction rate counts as a correct prediction
p(^ x) > p(~ x). If one assumes a symmetric loss function, then it is natural to set ~ p(x) = 0:5. See Heckman et al.
(1998) for an example.
17See Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1996), Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), Heckman et al.
(1998), and Smith and Todd (2005) for more on these issues.
9to our approach are our qualitative observations of the approvals process: specically, that the
nal approval (and hence selection into the treatment group) is tantamount to a lottery for
applicants that successfully traverse stages 1{4. If this is true, all that remains is to control
for entry into the pipeline (i.e., a measure of application date), as well as variables that are
likely to covary with application date. The most important variables (already outlined in table
1), again are informed from our qualitative study of the LRAD approvals process, and from
detailed face-to-face interviews with sta of the LRAD program.
We model the probability of selection into the treatment group parametrically by running
a logit regression. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if a household is in the treatment
group, and a value of 0 if it is in the control group and has passed stage 4 of the approval
process. Table 2 shows two specications of the logit regression. The rst specication contains
a parsimonious list of regressors, whereas the second contains additional controls and a more

exible specication.
The signs of the variables in the parsimonious regression can be read o the table directly,
and are informative in terms of understanding the screening process of LRAD. Two immedi-
ately noticeable features, already highlighted by the descriptive statistics, is that the apparent
targeting of women by the LRAD program does not seem to be borne out by the data, since
female-headed households have a lower probability than male-headed households of gaining
admission into the program. Another interesting nding is the role of farming experience. In
the parsimonious specication, this variable appears insignicant, which would accord with our
intuitions about the LRAD screening process: individuals with little or no farming experience
would be screened out prior to stage 4 so it is not surprising that this variable turns out to be
insignicant in the propensity score regression. Yet, it would be reasonable to conjecture that
the eect of farming experience and other characteristics of the applicant like education aect
the selection probability non-linearly.
The second specication of the propensity score regression lends credence to this suspi-
cion. While the direction of the eects of education and farming experience are not as readily
apparent because of the non-linear specication, it is clear that both of these variables com-
bine non-linearly with the timing of entry into the applicant pool to signicantly aect the
treatment probability. This specication also dominates more parsimonious specications (in-
cluding several not reported here) in separating the treated from the control households, with
a prediction rate of 76.36%.
A key result from modeling the treatment probability in this way is shown in gure 1, which
depicts the supports of the estimated log-odds ratio. This gure allows a graphical assessment
of the common-support assumption that is required for use of matching estimators. Figure 1
clearly shows considerable overlap in supports for parts of each of the two empirical densities
with greatest concentrations of mass. Moreover, it is clear that even at very high probabilities
(log-odds of over 1.5 say), there are more than a handful of observations in the control group.
Thus, our binary treatment estimator that matches households non-parametrically over this
10space will generate treatment eects that are valid for virtually the full support of our matched
sample.
3.2 Balancing Tests
The balance test we employ works as follows: the support of the propensity score is partitioned
into disjoint sets such that: (i) the average propensity score within each of these sets is un-
correlated with treatment assignment and; (ii) the covariates are uncorrelated with treatment
assignment within each set. This idea is operationalized by arbitrarily grouping the data by
intervals of the propensity score, where initially the scores within each interval are quite sim-
ilar. An equality of means test between treatment and control observations is performed for
each of the regressors contained in x. If there are no statistically signicant dierences between
treatment and control for each of the covariates in the propensity score regression, then the
regressors are balanced. If a particular regressor is unbalanced for a particular interval, then
that stratum is split into further strata and the test is conducted again. This iterative process
continues until all the regressors are balanced. Tables 3 { 4 shows a summary of the results
from this test.18
There are 7 bins of the propensity score in the nal iteration of this balancing algorithm,
and as table 3 shows, in each case the p-value for an equality of means test of the propensity
score between the treatment and control groups is small enough to fail to reject the null
hypothesis of equality of means.
The nal step in checking for covariate balance is shown in table 4, which presents the
p-values of an equality of means test for each of the regressors used in the propensity score
regressions reported in table 2. As is evident from the results, each of the covariates contained
in x are well balanced across the 7 bins.
3.3 Empirical Estimates of Average Treatment Eects on Treated
We start with the standard GLM framework by modeling treatment assignment as a Bernoulli
trial. The probability mass function therefore is
f(Dijxi) = p
Di
i (1   pi)1 Di; Di = 0;1 (1)
where Di = G(x0
i), and where x is a k  1 column vector of covariates. Thus, the odds of
being treated are given by f(1) = p1(1   p)0 = p, whereas the odds of not being treated are
given by f(0) = p0(1   p)1 = 1   p.
As is implied by our discussion in section 3.1, we specialize G(x0
i) to the logistic cdf when
modeling pi. This representation of pi is especially useful in our context because ex0=(1+ex0)
is the canonical link function of the Bernoulli density, and this link function is sucient to
satisfy the key rst-order conditions of the maximized value of the log of equation 1.
18See Dehejia and Wahba (2002) for more on this algorithm.
11To dene an average treatment eect on the treated, we start by denoting Sp as the region
of common support of pi between the D = 1 and D = 0 distributions. Let N1 denote the set
of households that have already received land through LRAD, and let N0 denote the set of
households still awaiting nal approval (i.e., households that have passed stage 4 of the approval
process). Now denote as n1 the number of treated households falling into the common support
region of the estimated propensity score density; i.e., the number of households falling into the
set N1 \ Sp. Our matching estimator is then given by
 = (n1) 1 X
i2N1\Sp












where i 2 N1 \ Sp denotes the ith treated household from the set of households with
common support on pi. The second term in this expression serves as a matched substitute
for the outcomes of a randomized-out household of the treatment group, where the imputed
counterfactual outcome
P
j2N0 !(i;j)y0j is a kernel-weighted average over the set of possible


















where K is a kernel function, hn is a bandwidth parameter and x0
i is the log of odds
ratio.19 A notable feature of this weight function is that it accounts for the choice-based
nature of our survey design without the need for precise sampling weights, because matching
takes place on the log of odds ratio. As Heckman and Todd (2009) have shown, since the odds
ratio that is estimated using incorrect weights is a scalar multiple of the true odds ratio, and
because the odds-ratio is a monotonic transformation of the propensity score, one can match
on the log-odds ratio without reweighting equation 2.20
In our empirical estimates, we check that our average treatment eect  is robust to band-
width specication and kernel choice.21 Table 5 shows our estimates of the average treatment
eects that are generated when matching non-parametrically against the log-odds ratios that
19It is usual to match directly on pi. However, here we match on the log-odds ratio, for reasons we discuss




x0), and 1   pi = 1=(1 + e
x0
i). Thus ln(p=(1   p)) = x
0
i.
20The true sampling weights are unknown in our survey design because both the control group and treatment
group sampling frames contained many listings with missing information on the number of applicants at the
farm level (which was the rst stage of sampling). This missing information matters because the design was
meant to be self-weighted at the farm level. To correct for this missing information cell-median imputation was
used. These imputations potentially distort the sampling weights, thus exacerbating the choice-based nature of
the quasi-experimental survey design. Matching on the odds ratio therefore has the strong benet of holding
this aspect of the design constant.
21We also assume this kernel function is symmetric around zero and integrates to one. In estimating this kernel,
we experiment with a range of functional forms, but we benchmark against the Guassian kernel function, given





12are derived from the estimates presented in table 2 over the region of common support shown
in gure 1. Estimates are presented for each of ve choices of functional form for K, with
optimal bandwidths computed according to the plug-in approach of Silverman (1986). This
means that the optimal bandwidth will vary by kernel choice. We benchmark these estimates
against the Guassian kernel with a xed global bandwidth of 0.05, which gives an upper bound
average treatment eect of 28.36%. This estimate declines to 22.77% when we apply the opti-
mal plug-in bandwidth of 0.26 for the Gaussian kernel. This estimate is remarkably similar to
the average treatment eects found when applying the Epanechnikov and Quartic kernels.
The general conclusion we reach when comparing the results of table 5 is that our estimates
of average treatment eects do vary by choice of bandwidth, but in every case, our estimates
of the average impact of LRAD for LRAD beneciaries always exceeds a 20% change in per
capita monthly consumption.
These are very sizable eects. In the next section, we explore further whether these average
impacts mask other features of selectivity that a binary treatment approach cannot account
for.
4 Measuring Dynamic Impacts
Because LRAD land transfers emerged as part of a natural, as opposed to a controlled ex-
periment, beneciary households received land grants at dierent points in time. Within our
sample, some treated households had received land ve years before the survey date, while
others had only recently received transfers. The impact on the level of economic well-being of
the latter group might well be negligible if no income had yet been generated by the newly
acquired land. Indeed, if these households were busy investing in the newly acquired land, the
short run impact on household income and consumption could even be negative. In this case
the signicantly positive average treatment eect reported in the prior section would be a data-
weighted average of the zero or negative impact of the program on recent transfer recipients
combined with the positive impact on longer duration transfer recipients.
Full evaluation of the ecacy of the LRAD program requires information on the shape
of the \duration response function" and the long-run treatment eect to be enjoyed by asset
transfer beneciaries.
In addition to this possible rst year dip in living standards when individuals receive the
asset transfer, there are two other reasons why the impact of an asset transfer may change over
time. First, the beneciary may experience a learning eect with technical and entrepreneurial
eciency improving over time. Second, and consistent with the theoretical literature on asset
inequality discussed earlier, the asset transfer may create a crowding-in eect if the bene-
ciary further invests in the new enterprises made possible by the LRAD grant. Whether this
additional investment occurs because of improved access to nancial markets, or because of
learning eects, the overall impact on inequality in the long run is likely to be signicant, if
13LRAD transfers suce to lift households over the critical threshold asset level in a multiple
equilibrium model above which it is dynamically rational to accumulate further assets and
move ahead.22 It is these second round eects that are likely to distinguish asset transfer
programs from the many other policy instruments that might constitute a package of reforms
aimed at rural development.
If these observations are correct, then the duration response function { meaning the re-
lationship between program impact and duration of time since the asset was transferred {
is unlikely to be a simple step function that can be approximated with a binary treatment
estimate. The goal of this section is to estimate the impact dynamics and duration response
function and recover both the long-run impact of land transfers and their time path. Both are
of particular relevance from a policy perspective. Indeed, it is the prospect that asset transfer
programs, such as land reform, facilitate and crowd-in additional asset building that makes
them especially interesting as an anti-poverty program.
4.1 Modeling the Duration Response Function
A natural starting point for this analysis ordinarily would be to consider a random coecients
model (Heckman and Robb 1985). However, as we have argued above, the variables predicting
treatment status enter non-linearly in the logit regression of treatment, which implies that
the minimum mean square error approximation to the underlying CEF (i.e., the non-linear
analogue to a linear regression control-function) does not have a straightforward interpretation,
because the regression coecients in such a model would actually represent a matrix-weighted
average of the gradient of the CEF (Chamberlain and Leamer 1976). This problem can be
overcome if the CEF of our treatment duration variable were restricted to be linear, as in
Angrist (1998), but then we would still require a large number of observations for each value of
treatment duration to justify this approach. An alternative approach that would not necessitate
such an assumption is the extension of the propensity score approach developed by Hirano and
Imbens (2004).
We begin by restricting attention to the sample of households in the treatment group, i 2
N1. We then postulate a duration-response function yi(d) for all d 2 D given that i 2 N1; i.e.,
each household could have any potential outcome from the set D depending on its duration of
treatment. When treatment status is binary, we have D = f0;1g, but here we let D = fd0;d1g.
In the empirical implementation, we measure duration as the number of days between land
transfer and the date of the survey.
22Formal models of the emergence of poverty traps highlight the interplay of investments and occupational
structure. A key feature of this literature is the idea that non-convexities in the production of human capital are
induced by indivisibilities in its investment as well as imperfections in credit markets. In this class of models, the
shape of the aggregate distribution of occupations (and therefore long-run inequality) is strongly dependent on
the opportunity sets of the previous generation. Galor and Zeira (1993) is the classic reference in this literature.
Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) and Carter and Barrett (2006) and Mookherjee and Ray (2002) are recent
extensions to this framework that suggest a strong role for asset redistribution of the kind that the LRAD
program is concerned with.
14The evaluation problem of course results from the fact that each household realizes exactly
one outcome, associated with its actual duration in the LRAD program yi = yi(Di), where Di 2
[d0;d1]. However, under the continuous treatment case, the problem is further complicated by
the fact that there is more than one counterfactual duration, because we have Di 2 D. We
therefore dene the impact of LRAD in this continuous case in terms of an average duration-
response function, (d) = E[yi(d)]. Our goal then is to uncover non-constant treatment eects
by taking the dierence between this average and some benchmark level of treatment; namely
(d) = (d)   (~ d) = E[y(d)]   E[y(~ d)] ~ d;d 2 D (4)
where ~ d serves as the benchmark duration.23 In our empirical estimates, we set ~ d to be the
lowest length of exposure observed in the data.
As in the binary approach, statistically valid identication depends on an independence
assumption regarding treatment assignment. Following Imbens (2000), we dene weak uncon-
foundedness:24
y(d)?Djx 8d 2 D
To x ideas, dene r(d;x) as the conditional density of treatment duration given the covariates
r(d;x) = fDjx(d;x) (5)
and dene a generalized propensity score (GPS) R = r(D;X). Using this framework, Hirano
and Imbens (2004) then show that assignment to treatment duration (or equivalently, the
timing of treatment), is unconfounded when fD(djr(d;x);Y (d)) = fD(djr(d;X)).25
As discussed in Section 1, all LRAD beneciaries passed through a rigorous 5 stage approval
process. As detailed in that earlier section, time spent in the approval process appears to be
orthogonal to beneciary characteristics and expected gains from the program, Y (d). Condi-
tional on original program application date (which is observed), the LRAD natural experiment
conforms to the unconfoundedness assumption.26
23To simplify the notation, we drop the i subscripting when making reference to realised outcomes or treatment
levels.
24This is essentially a weaker version of the Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)\strong ignorability" assumption,
generalized to multi-valued treatments. Hirano and Imbens (2004) refer to this assumption as weak uncon-
foundedness as it does not require joint independence of all potential outcomes, fy(d)gt2[t0;t1] but rather that
conditional independence holds for each value of D. For alternative approaches to non-binary treatments, see
Behrman, Cheng and Todd (2004) and Imai and van Dyk (2004)
25For the proof, as well as further details about assumptions regarding the probability space used in
the proof, see their theorem 1. Two key assumptions are that D is continuously distributed with respect
to Lebesgue measure on D, and that r(d;x) is measurable with respect to the -algebra generated by x.
Based on these assumptions, they then show that using standard results on iterated integrals, that the
right hand side of this expression can be written as fD(d j r(d;x)) =
R
fD(d j x;r(d;x))dFx(x j r(d;x)) =
r(d;x). Then by weak unconfoundedness, they show that this quantity must equal fD(d j r(d;x)Y (d)) = R
fD(d j x;r(d;x);Y (d))dFx(x j Y (d);r(d;x)), which in turn is equal to the left hand side.
26There is a strong analogy between our analysis of LRAD and the Hirano and Imbens (2004) study of
the impact of lottery winnings on labor supply. In both cases, the focus is only on `players,' meaning those
self-selected individuals who either applied for an LRAD grant or who purchased lottery tickets. Also in both
15Under the assumption of unconfoundedness, Hirano and Imbens (2004) then show how the
GPS can be used to identify (d). Two steps are involved in this proof. First, using Bayes
rule and their theorem 1, they show that in estimating the conditional expectation of the
outcomes, all relevant information about the conditional density of the treatment is controlled
for by directly conditioning on the treatment level D and the generalized propensity score ^ Ri.
Second, to estimate the duration-response function, (d;r(d;X)), at a particular level of the
treatment they average this conditional expectation over the GPS at that particular level of
the treatment, (d) = E[(d;r(d;X))] and then by iterated expectations, E[(d;r(d;x))] =
E[E[y(d) j r(d;x)]] = E[y(d)] obtains.27 Thus knowledge of (D;R) will identify the average
duration-response function, under weak unconfoundedness conditional on the GPS.
To implement this estimator, we follow Hirano and Imbens (2004) and assume that the
conditional density of the duration of treatment is normally distributed with mean x
c and













To estimate the duration-response function, we model the conditional expectation of yi, as a

exible function of Di and Ri
(Di;Ri) = E[YijDi; ^ Ri] = 0 + 1Di + 2D2
i + 3 ^ Ri +
4 ^ R2
i + 5Di ^ Ri (7)
Equation 7 is then estimated by OLS.28 Once we have the k, we can then recover the average
duration response function E[y(d)]. Recall that E[y(d)] is identied for particular levels of
duration, so the average must be taken over all households at duration level d. This eectively
equates to averaging over the GPS for each duration level d. By changing the treatment level
at which the averaging takes place, we recover an estimate of the entire duration-response
cases, the unconfoundedness is met as the intensity of treatment (timing of land transfer or amount of lottery
winnings) was generated by essentially a random process unrelated to expected impacts of the treatment.
27Importantly, note that under this approach, the averaging that is used to construct (d) takes places over
the GPS score evaluated at the treatment level of interest, r(d;x), and not over the GPS itself.
28It should be stressed that the regression function (d;r) does not have a causal interpretation. In particular,
the derivative with respect to the treatment level d does not represent an average eect of changing the level
of treatment for any particularly subpopulation. We also experimented with various specications for this
regression and conclude that not much additional explanatory power is added by including higher than second-
order polynomials in D and ^ R.
16function.29 This gives a treatment eect estimator of the form





(^ 0 + ^ 1  d + ^ 2  d2 + ^ 3  ^ r(d;xi) (8)
+^ 4  ^ r(d;xi)2 + ^ 5  d  ^ r(d;xi))
Finally, to compute a non-constant eect of treatment on treated, we estimate
^ (d) = ^ (d)   ^ (~ d) 8d 2 D (9)
where ~ d has been xed at the benchmark level discussed earlier.
4.2 Generalized Propensity Score Estimates and Balancing Tests
As noted above, our treatment variable is the duration of exposure to the LRAD program,
measured as the number of days elapsed since the date of transfer of the land. Table 6 presents
maximum likelihood estimates of the conditional distribution of this treatment variable. We
use the same specication to that chosen for the binary case. These estimates assume that
our treatment variable conditioned on the covariates is normally distributed. The assumption
turns out to be satised if we normalize the treatment variable by the maximum number of
days a household could be exposed to the program. Specically, we nd that the assumption
of normality is satised at the 1% level using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality of the
errors.
Our next step is to recover the GPS according to equation 6. To investigate whether the
specication used in equation 6 is adequate, we test for balancing of the covariates once we
condition on the estimated GPS. The test has the same intuition as that of the binary case,
and is based on the algorithm followed by Hirano and Imbens (2004), and the implementation
developed by Bia and Mattei (2008).
The basic structure of the test is as follows: we partition the support of D into three
mutually exclusive intervals, denoted as G1;:::;G3. Within each treatment interval Gk, we
compute the GPS r(dGk;xi) at the mean of the interval dGk 2 Gk. Then, for each of the
three intervals we estimate the GPS at these treatment interval means dGk and then discretize
the distribution of the GPS evaluated at this representative point. In our model, we chose 6




6 . Within each interval B
(k)
j for j = 1;:::;6
and k = 1;2;3, we compute the dierence in means for each covariate across dierent treatment
intervals, but in the same GPS interval (i.e., j is held constant while k is varied). This results
in 6 mean dierences for each dGk 2 Gk. This information is then collapsed into a single
metric, by taking a weighted average of the dierences at each representative point, where the
29We estimate standard errors and condence intervals for each point along the duration-response function
using bootstrap methods. However, in principal, analytical standard errors can also be computed given the
parametric forms of the GPS and (D;R).
17weights are equivalent to the number of observations within each block B
(k)
j . This procedure
is repeated for each covariate, so that in total, we have 39 such weighted averages (i.e., 13
covariates across 3 treatment intervals). In a nal step, these weighted averages are then
used to construct test statistics. Table 8 reports Bayes factors that are computed o of these
weighted averages. Overall, the model is well balanced as the lowest Bayes factor of 0.3364
falls within an acceptable range of the Jeery's order of magnitude criterion. Decisive rejection
of the null that the data are balanced requires a minimum Bayes factor of less than 0.01.
4.3 Empirical Estimates of Dynamic Treatment Eects
Figure 2 graphs the estimated GPS-adjusted average treatment eect as a function of the
duration of treatment. While the model was estimated using the natural logarithm of per-capita
monthly expenditures, the estimates were converted back to natural units (South African Rand
per-person, per-month) in order to ease interpretation. The corresponding 95% condence
interval (calculated using bootstrap estimates of the standard error) is shown by dashed lines.
As can be seen, a household with a trivial treatment duration is estimated to have a per-capita
living standard of 400 Rand per-month. By way of comparison, the average per-capita living
standard of approved applicant, non-beneciary household is 466 Rand per month (Table 1)
and the South African poverty line{shown on the gure{is approximately 430 Rand.
As is apparent from Figure 2, the treatment response function is far from the simple step
function that would indicate binary treatment estimates capture all the relevant dimensions of
program impact. Noticeable is the sharp drop in consumption over the rst year of exposure,
and then a period of quick recovery over the second year, reaching impact magnitudes similar
to the binary non-parametric binary ATT estimates reported in Table 5. Beyond the second
year, the estimated average treatment eect rises further to about 300 Rand, an increase of
almost 75% over the low dosage level, or 45% higher than the mean of the non-treated control
group.
As can be seen, increases of this magnitude take households that are in the vicinity of the
poverty line and lift them well above it. In addition, with an average of 5 individuals per-family,
it takes only a short time before the direct program benets swamp the direct monetary value
of the asset transfer.
In summary, these patterns accord with what one would expect of an asset transfer program
like LRAD, where participants inevitably must confront the vagaries entailed in a farming
enterprise. More generally, as King and Behrman (2009) have argued, a variety of factors
might account for why there could be a lag, or more gradual realization of the benets of anti-
poverty programs. This is especially the case for a program like LRAD, which is aimed not
only at aecting rural livelihoods directly, by changing the incentives governing work eort,
but also indirectly through changing the underlying wealth distribution in rural areas.
185 Conclusion
The largely theoretical literature on asset inequality has long suggested that asset transfers {
such as land redistribution { can be an eective anti-poverty tool. Not only should they be
constrained by fewer questions about work disincentives than are cash transfers, they should be
able to generate very high rates of return if they succeed in unlocking the productive potential
of the poor by improving their market access and perhaps getting them over a critical minimum
threshold.
Despite this promise, well-identied empirical evidence on ecacy of land redistribution has
been scarce, in no small part because the most interesting reforms arise endogenously, either
as a response to, or as a cause of, con
ict. This fact places limits on the uses of experimental
approaches to identify impacts. For this paper, we have been able to explore a relatively low
con
ict situation (South Africa) and exploit the fact that the implementation of its market-
assisted land reform program generated a natural experiment, allowing identication of the
impact of land transfers on the economic well-being of poor and near poor households.
Standard binary treatment eect estimates indicate that the land transfers boosted house-
hold living standards by 25%. More interestingly, our continuous treatment estimates, which
exploits variations in the period of ownership of the redistributed land, show that living stan-
dards initially dip with the land transfers, but then after three years rise to levels that imply
a 50% increase in living standards of the treated households who entered the program with
poverty line standards of living. Both the temporal pattern of this impact, and its magnitude,
are consistent with the theoretical literature on asset transfers and their potential to crowd-in
investment, learning and income increases beyond what would be expected from the direct
transfer alone.
Compared to cash transfers, where it is possible to \just give the poor, any poor, the
money" (Hanlon, Barrientos and Hulme 2010), asset transfers are clearly more complicated
and have a more limited scope as not everyone can be a successful small-scale farmer. It
also remains to be determined if the increases in family well-being detected by the South
African land redistribution program spill over into the kinds of investment in child human
capital detected in conditional and unconditional cash transfer programs. Subject to these
limitations, the impacts detected here would seem to motivate further experimentation with
asset transfer programs.
19Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Treated Controls 0 < d < 2 2 < d < 3 d > 3 All
Per-capita consumption 594.5 466.4 486.6 548.1 749.1 501.2
(1098.1) (692.0) (906.2) (713.1) (1485.7) (824.1)
Application date 1803.1 1675.7 1775.6 1717.6 1908.0 1710.3
(761.1) (1302.1) (865.9) (714.9) (670.2) (1181.0)
Transfer date 808.6 0 337.6 837.9 1278.3 219.9
(456.6) (0) (305.0) (55.93) (239.1) (431.4)
Family Labor 0.787 0.436 1.156 0.496 0.658 0.532
(1.291) (0.942) (1.789) (0.791) (0.870) (1.060)
Household head is male 0.754 0.667 0.725 0.719 0.816 0.690
(0.431) (0.472) (0.448) (0.451) (0.389) (0.462)
Education of household head (yrs) 6.447 5.843 5.088 7.193 7.217 6.007
(4.880) (4.496) (4.058) (5.084) (5.198) (4.610)
Mean farming experience (yrs) 1.594 1.464 1.361 1.292 2.108 1.500
(3.706) (3.784) (3.754) (2.213) (4.581) (3.763)
Household Size 6.060 6.138 6.675 5.852 5.599 6.117
(3.532) (3.732) (4.013) (3.192) (3.192) (3.678)
Relocated to Participate 0.208 0.0727 0.206 0.126 0.283 0.109
(0.406) (0.260) (0.406) (0.333) (0.452) (0.312)
Notes: Sample sizes of treatment group = 448; sample size of control group = 1202. Monthly
per capita consumption expenditure is in 2005 Rands. The Application Date and Transfer Date
are measured as the number of days elapsed between the relevant milestone and the date of
commencement of eldwork. The duration of treatment, d is measured in years. The nal column
shows means (standard deviations) for the combined sample of treated and control households.
Tests of the restriction that the dierence in means for each variable between the treatment and
control groups equal zero: pce (p = 0.0053); doseapp (p = 0.0502); onfarmemp (p = 0.0000);
sexhead (p = 0.0008); hheadeduc (p = 0.0147); farmexper (p = 0.5434); residents (p = 0.7425);
moved (p = 0.0000).
20Table 2: Propensity Score Regressions
Variable (1) (2)
Family Labour .252 .342
(.052) (.064)
Application Date .623 44.787
(.082) (3.745)
Household Head is Male .385 .353
(.131) (.146)
Education of Household Head (yrs) .052 -.867
(.013) (.259)




Relocated to Participate 1.321
(.205)
Application Date Squared -3.058
(.253)
Education of household head Squared .006
(.004)
Mean farming experience Squared -.002
(.002)
Education  Experience .146
(.081)
Application Date  Experience .243
(.078)
Application Date  Education .108
(.034)




Notes: The regressions are based on the logit model. The dependent variable
equals one if the household is in the LRAD treatment group and zero if it is
in the LRAD control group.
21Table 3: Propensity Score Balance
Strata ^ p(x) cuto N0 N1 p-value
1.00 0.02 227 11 0.2605
2.00 0.1 160 32 0.2504
3.00 0.2 318 139 0.9713
4.00 0.4 180 173 0.1200
5.00 0.6 24 23 0.0156
6.00 0.7 7 32 0.1618
7.00 0.8 8 38 0.2496
Notes: "Strata" refers to mutually exclusive intervals
of the estimated propensity score distribution. These
intervals are dened by the cut-o points given by ^ p(x).
The fth column in the table reports the p-value of a
two-sided test of the null hypothesis of a dierence in
the mean value of the estimate propensity score between
treatment and control within each stratum.
22Table 4: Covariate Balance
Strata of ^ p(x)
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Family Labour 0.316 0.277 0.353 0.054 0.351 0.504 0.648
Application Date 0.101 0.600 0.012 0.630 0.121 0.776 0.679
Household Head is Male 0.060 0.078 0.450 0.532 0.045 0.026 0.518
Education of Household Head (yrs) 0.058 0.435 0.098 0.314 0.391 0.944 0.019
Mean Farming Experience (yrs) 0.126 0.734 0.381 0.478 0.583 0.427 0.660
Household Size 0.651 0.025 0.746 0.026 0.040 0.161 0.396
Relocated to Participate 0.417 0.426 0.561 0.917 0.684 0.082 0.020
Application Date Squared 0.094 0.569 0.011 0.656 0.120 0.806 0.690
Education of household head Squared 0.096 0.522 0.044 0.107 0.371 0.922 0.055
Mean farming experience Squared 0.405 0.505 0.403 0.197 0.847 0.565 0.620
Education 0.092 0.796 0.990 0.770 0.816 0.708 0.239
Application Date  Experience 0.165 0.700 0.417 0.473 0.642 0.427 0.658
Application Date  Education 0.165 0.550 0.189 0.361 0.410 0.962 0.016
Application Date  Experience  Education 0.107 0.861 0.954 0.759 0.867 0.725 0.254
Notes: The table shows that the covariates are balanced once we condition on the propensity score. The column
headings refer to the 7 intervals of the propensity score distribution within which the estimated propensity
score is balanced (see table 3. The entries in each table report the p-value for an equality of means test of each
regressor by treatment status.
23Table 5: Average Treatment Eect on Per Capita Consumption (Percentage Change)
Kernel Kernel Optimal ATT t-ratio t-ratio
Function K(s) Bandwidth Analytical Bstrap
Gaussian (2) 1=2 exp( s2=2)   28.36 2.04 2.41
Gaussian (2) 1=2 exp( s2=2) 0.26 22.77 1.72 1.84
Epanechnikov 3
4(1   s2)  1(jsj < 1) 0.59 22.34 1.69 1.88
Quartic 15
16(1   s2)2  1(jsj < 1) 0.69 22.45 1.69 1.69
Rectangular 1
2(jsj < 1) 0.23 25.16 1.85 1.96
Tricube 70
80(1   s3)3  1(jsj < 1) 0.50 24.39 1.82 1.76
Notes: The rst ATT estimate using the Gaussian Kernel uses a xed global bandwidth of 0.05, whereas
the remaining Kernel estimators use an optimal bandwidth calculated according to Silverman's (1986) plug-in
formula. Bootstrapped standard errors are over 100 replications. Matching occurs over the common support of
the log-odds ratio. In addition, a further trimming rule of 2% is used.
24Table 6: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Parameters of the Generalized Propensity
Score
Variable Coecient (Std. Err.)
Household head is male 0.055 (0.023)
Education of household head (yrs) -0.014 (0.012)
Mean farming experience (yrs) 0.053 (0.019)
Household Size -0.006y (0.003)
Relocated to Participate 0.032 (0.025)
Application Date 0.000 (0.000)
Application Date  Farming Experience 0.000 (0.000)
Education of the Household Head Squared 0.001 (0.001)
Farming Experience Squared 0.000 (0.000)
Education  Experience -0.006 (0.003)
Application Date  Education 0.000 (0.000)
Application Date Squared 0.000 (0.000)
Application Date  Experience  Education 0.000 (0.000)
Intercept -0.261 (0.127)





Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
25Table 7: OLS Estimates of the Parameters of the Conditional Expectation of Monthly Per
Capita Consumption given Di and ^ Ri
Variable Coecient (Std. Err.)
Normalized Duration of Treatment -1.334 (1.034)
Normalized Duration of Treatment Squared 1.476 (1.112)
Estimated GPS -1.353 (0.484)
Estimated GPS Squared 0.500 (0.184)




Signicance levels : y : 10%  : 5%  : 1%
26Table 8: Bayes Factor Tests of Equality of the Conditional Means of the Covariates given the
Generalized Propensity Score
Normalized Treatment Intervals
Variable [0,0.37] [0.37,0.47] [0.47,1]
Household head is male 3.0899 3.9107 5.8918
Education of household head (yrs) 0.8949 2.2702 5.2837
Mean farming experience (yrs) 5.5048 4.1895 5.7830
Household Size 6.4096 5.3034 4.9582
Relocated to Participate 5.9554 0.4677 2.8339
Application Date 6.1249 3.8364 1.9113
Application Date  Farming Experience 5.9762 3.7087 5.7806
Education of the Household Head Squared 0.3364 1.4644 4.9125
Farming Experience Squared 6.2360 3.4174 5.9819
Education  Experience 2.5461 4.8163 4.7199
Application Date  Education 0.8618 4.0728 5.8074
Application Date Squared 6.1396 4.0811 2.7045
Application Date  Experience  Education 3.1035 3.7053 3.3773
Notes: Table entries are the Bayes factor test statistics of the hypothesis that the mean in one of the three treat-
ment groups is not statistically dierent to the mean in the other two groups combined. The specic algorithm
we use is based on Hirano and Imbens (2004). See Bia and Mattei(2008) for details on the implementation. The
main idea of the algorithm is estimate the GPS at a representative point within each treatment interval (here
chosen to be the mean) and then discretize the distribution of the GPS evaluated at this representative point.
In our model, we chose 6 mutually exclusive blocks. At the mean of each treatment interval, a Bayes factor
in excess of 1 therefore counts as decisive evidence that a covariate is adequately balanced between interval k,
block j and interval not k, block j. Overall, the model is well balanced as the lowest Bayes factor of 0.3364 falls
within an acceptable range of the Jeery's order of magnitude criterion. Decisive rejection of the null that the
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Figure 1: Distribution of Estimated Log Odds Ratios
28Figure 2: Duration Response Function
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